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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY AND/OR
EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY,

]

Petitioners/Appellants,
vs.

Court of Appeals
]

)

GEORGE ROY GREEN, THE INDUSTRIAL
]
COMMISSION OF UTAH AND THE SECOND ]
INJURY FUND,
]
I
Respondents,

Case No. 870189-CA

Category No. 6

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY
AND/OR EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the instant case, the Commission1s finding that
Mr. Green suffered a compensable industrial accident on
September 6, 198 5, is contrary to current Utah law.

Not only

does his injury on that date fail to come within the definition
of "accident" as that term is presently defined for purposes of
Utah Worker's Compensation law, but Mr. Green also failed to
meet the higher standard of legal causation required of workers
with preexisting conditions.
When reviewing the Commission's findings regarding
general questions of law, the appropriate standard of review to
be applied is a "correction-of-error" standard and no

deference is owed to Commission findings.

The Commission erred

in awarding Mr. Green compensation for permanent and total
disability at a rate greater than 66-2/3% of his average weekly
wage at the time of his injury.

The Commission's award of

compensation is based upon its interpretation of the interplay
between Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-75. The Commission's interpretation of the
above-cited statutory provisions is also contrary to law and
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT GEORGE ROY GREEN'S INJURY ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1985,
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
UNDER CURRENT UTAH LAW
A.

Mr. Green's Injury of September 6, 1985, Was
Not An "Unintended or Unexpected Event" Giving
Rise To An "Accident."

Petitioners contend that the circumstances leading to
Mr. Green's injury on September 6, 1985, do not constitute
an "accident" as that term is currently defined for purposes of
Utah Worker's Compensation Law.

In Allen v. Industrial

Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
defined the term "accident" as "an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an
injury."

(Emphasis added.)

Id. at 22.

At the hearing of

his claim, Mr. Green testified that he had experienced similar
lightning-bolt like pain in his back on numerous occasions
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prior to his September 1985 injury.

Furthermore, he indicated

that the occurrence of this back pain was related to the duties
he was performing.

He stated:

Q#

And you explained to Dr. Henry that
occasionally from time-to-time, you
had stabbing pain in your back?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you described that to Dr. Henry
that it was an 'acute stabbing pain
which1 is almost bolt-like lightning
pain ?

A.

Just like.

Q.

And that you'd be sore afterwards?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And that you would treat this kind of
stabbing pain that you'd get in your
back by taking a hot bath?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And then lying down for a couple of
hours after that to obtain relief?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And so it wasn't unusual from
time-to-time to have this
lightning-like pain in your low back;
is that true?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And you'd treat it by hot tub and
rest, essentially; is that true?

A.

That's true.

Q.

Can you give me an estimate as to how
often you'd get this lightning-like
pain in your back? Was that once a
week, once a month—

A.

That would depend on the chores I had
to do. The work I had to do.
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Q.

It's kind of related to the chores
you did?

A.

Yes.

(R. at 74-75.)

(Emphasis supplied.)

And finally, Mr. Green

also stated that he had been having these lightning-bolt like
pains in his back ever since suffering an injury while working
for Paulsen Steel Company in 1983.

(R. at 8 6.)

In spite of his own testimony that it was not unusual
for him to experience lightning-bolt like pain in his back
while performing his work activities, Mr. Green still contends
that the circumstances leading to his injury, on September 6,
1985, rise to the level of an industrial "accident."

As

support for this position he reasons that, inasmuch as he did
not anticipate his lifting activities on that date to result in
further injury to his back, he suffered an "unexpected or
unintended occurrence."

The Utah Supreme Court has defined the

term "accident" for purposes of the worker's compensation law
very broadly.

However, if the reasoning of Mr. Green is

accepted, even the limited boundaries now existing will be
essentially eliminated for one can always argue that further
injury was not anticipated on any given occasion even though
further injury may very well have been a foreseeable
consequence of engaging in particular activities.

Because Mr.

Green's injury on September 6, 1985, was foreseeable in view of
his prior back history, and because he had in fact experienced
similar if not identical pain on numerous prior occasions,
petitioners contend the injury he suffered on September 6,
1985, was not an "unexpected or unintended occurrence" and it,
-4-

therefore, does not constitute an "accident" under Utah
Worker's Compensation law.
B.

Mr. Green Failed to Meet the Higher Standard
of Legal Causation Required Under Allen For
Individuals Suffering From a Preexisting
Condition.

It is not contested by either the petitioners or the
respondents that, in order for Mr. Green to meet the higher
legal causation requirement identified in Allen, he must
prove that the activities required by his employment
substantially increased the risk of injury he already faced in
everyday life due to his condition.

Mr. Green was injured when

he reached over the side of a small Datsun pickup to lift a
bucket of debris, weighing approximately thirty pounds, from
the bed of the pickup.

Respondents contend that this activity

required unusual exertion inasmuch as Mr. Green was leaning
over the side of the pickup at the same time he was lifting the
bucket and the bucket allegedly snagged on another bucket in
the truck as he lifted it.

In Allen, supra, the Utah

Supreme Court identified several activities as being typical
requirements of everyday living.

Those activities included

"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile,
lifting a small child to chest height and climbing the stairs
in buildings."

Allen, at 26. Respondents allege that in

comparing the above activities to Mr. Green's activities on the
date of his injury, the petitioners have altered the Court's
list by adding the elements of leaning over and reaching while
-5-

lifting to each activity.

However, it should be noted that the

activities identified by the Supreme Court typically, if not
necessarily, require leaning over and reaching while lifting.
While it is true one may lift a piece of luggage from the
ground by bending the knees, holding it close to the chest and
raising up by straightening the legs and keeping the back
straight (the type of lifting described by respondent
Industrial Commission), unloading that same piece of luggage
from the trunk of an automobile generally requires leaning over
the vehicle and lifting the luggage at the same time.
Certainly respondents cannot dispute the fact that the lifting
and carrying of luggage, identified by the Supreme Court as a
typical requirement of everyday living, frequently requires
loading or unloading of that luggage.

It is also obvious that

the changing of a flat tire on an automobile would normally
require leaning over, reaching and lifting all at the same time
since most spare tires are located in the trunk of the
vehicle.

Thus, the petitioners1 reference to leaning over and

lifting in connection with the "typical" activities identified
by the Court, does not act to alter the Court's list.
As further support for their position that the
lifting of thirty pounds by Mr. Green was not unusual exertion,
petitioners point to the fact that, even following his latest
surgery, Mr. Green was advised by his doctor to "avoid frequent
lifting of over 10 pounds and occasional lifting from the waist
level of over 25 pounds."
citing R. at 248.)

(Respondent Green's Brief at 3,

In other words, even in his current medical
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condition, it appears Mr. Green can occasionally lift 25
pounds.

Nevertheless, respondents continue to claim that the

lifting of a bucket weighing 30 pounds constitutes "unusual and
extraordinary" exertion.

It is ironical that, now, Mr. Green

may occasionally lift 25 pounds as a part of his ordinary
non-employment life, whereas the occasional lifting of a
30-pound bucket at work prior to his surgery, allegedly
constituted unusual and extraordinary effort.
The instant case is one of those rare cases where the
Court can properly deny the applicant's claim for benefits for
the injury he suffered on September 6, 1985, and still not
deprive him of compensation.

As stated previously, Mr. Green's

current claim is a claim for permanent and total disability.
It has already been determined that Mr. Green is a proper
candidate for permanent and total disability benefits and
petitioners do not contest this fact.

The finding with which

petitioners take issue is the finding that the events of
September 6, 1985, constitute a compensable industrial accident
rendering Mr. Green permanently and totally disabled.
It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Green went to
work for American Roofing Company he was suffering from
significant preexisting back problems.

It is also undisputed

that, due to the preexisting condition of his back, bending and
lifting activities frequently resulted in pain in his back.
(R. at 74-75.)

When Mr. Green lifted the bucket of debris on

September 6, 1985, the pain he experienced was just like that
he had suffered on numerous previous occasions.
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Because the

events leading to this particular aggravation of his
preexisting back condition were activities typical of
nonemployment life and because his resulting injury was not
unexpected in view of his past history, it cannot be said that
Mr. Green's employment duties that day resulted in a new
"accident."

Rather, Mr. Green simply experienced an

aggravation of his preexisting condition and his resulting
disability is, therefore, properly the responsibility of his
former employers and the Second Injury Fund.
As further support for their position in this regard,
petitioners point to the fact that, prior to his injury of
September 6, 1985, Mr. Green had voluntarily cut back on the
number of hours per week he was working for petitioner American
Roofing due to the occasional lightning-bolt pains he had in
his back.

He testified in this regard as follows:
Q.

He also indicates — Dr. Henry in his
office notes of May 14, 1985 — that
the reason you'd cut down on your job
was that the pain in your back was
such that you felt like you had to cut
down. And I'm assuming Dr. Henry got
that information from you?

A.

That's true.

Q.

Because of these occasional pains in
your back, this lightning bolt in your
back, it prevented you from working
full-time?

A.

It made me lose my desire.

Q.

And for that reason, that was why you
weren't working 4 0 hours a week; right?

A.

Well, that's true. But we didn't have
that much work anyway.
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Q.

So a combination of the two, you cut
back on your —

A.

Right.

(R. at 76-77.)

Furthermore, Mr. Green first began experiencing

these lightning-bolt like pains in his back following his
injury with Paulsen Steel Company in 1983:
Q.

And in 1956 you were working, you
think, in February that year, and you
fell a couple of feet on some
insulation?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you hurt your low back, the same
area we have been talking about today?

A.

That's true.

Q.

And it's been ever since 1956 that
you've had this occasional pain your
back?
It hasn't really been that bad, not up
until '83.

A.
Q.

And then after 198 3, it was at that
point that you had an occasional
lightning bolt as you've described it,
in your back?

A.

That's true.

Q.

So would it be fair to say that from
1956 to 1983 you had occasional pain
in your back, but then in 1983,
following your injury with Paulsen
Steel, that you had the beginning of
the lightning-bolt sensation in your
back?

A.

That's true.

(R. at 85-76.)
In view of the above-cited testimony of Mr. Green
regarding the timing of the onset of the lightning-bolt like
pain in his back and his reason for cutting back on his weekly
-9-

hours, it is apparent that Mr. Green's back was in such a
condition that it was just as likely it would give way while
lifting something at home, as it would while lifting something
at work.

Thus, if this Court finds that Mr. Green's activities

of September 6, 1985, do not constitute a compensable
accident, the burden of compensation will fall upon the proper
parties.
In view of the above-cited facts, petitioners submit
that the lifting of thirty pounds, even though done while
leaning over the side of a small pickup, is not sufficient to
meet the requirements of legal causation set forth in Allen.
Therefore, Mr. Green's injury of September 6, 1985, does not
rise to the level of a compensable industrial accident; rather,
it amounts to an aggravation of his 198 3 injury.
POINT II
"CORRECTION-OF-ERROR" STANDARD IS APPLIED IN
DETERMINING GENERAL QUESTIONS OF LAW.
Petitioners do not contest the standard of review,
cited by Mr. Green, by which this Court is bound when
reviewing the findings of the Commission on questions of fact.
However, where the issue presented is a question of law, the
applicable standard of review is a "correction of error"
standard.

This standard was identified by the Utah Supreme

Court in Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d
779 (Utah 1984).

Therein, the court stated:

In reviewing the Commission's
interpretations of general questions of
law, we apply a correction-of-error
standard, with no deference given to the
-10-

Commission's interpretations,
omitted.)
Dean Evans at 782.

(Citations

In Board of Education of Alpine School

Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court
relied upon the correction-of-error standard to reverse an
Administrative Law Judge's award of compensation to a public
school volunteer.

The Administrative Law Judge had determined

that the provisions of U.C.A. § 49-6a-31 (1953 as amended)
relating to volunteer fireman and U.C.A. § 63-34-11 (1983
Supp.) relating to volunteers of the State Department of
Natural Resources implied that the Legislature intended
worker's compensation benefits to be available to all
volunteers.

The Supreme Court, disagreed, however, and ruled

that the Administrative Law Judge's interpretation of the
aforementioned statutory provisions was "patently incorrect,"
once again stressing that where an appropriate court is
reviewing interpretations of general questions of law, a
correction-of-error standard is applied and no deference is
given to the expertise of the Commission.
In the instant case, the Commission's interpretation
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-67 and 35-1-75 are clearly
questions of law.

Thus, a correction-of-error standard

should be applied in reviewing the Commission's decision and no
deference need be given its determination.
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POINT III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT MR. GREEN DID SUFFER A
COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, HIS RATE OF
COMPENSATION IS LIMITED TO 66-2/3% OF HIS
ACTUAL WORKING WEEKLY WAGE AT THE
TIME OF HIS INJURY.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 governs benefits for
claims for permanent and total disability.

That section

provides as follows:
In cases of permanent total disability, the
employer shall receive 66-2/3% of his
average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, . . .
In the instant case, the Commission awarded Mr. Green
compensation at the rate of $201.00 per week.

This award

amounts to approximately 98% of Mr. Green's average working
wage at the time of his injury of $206.00 per week.

As support

for its award of compensation in excess of that provided for by
§ 35-1-67, the Commission cites § 35-1-75(1)(e) which states:
If at the time of the injury the wages are
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage
shall be determined by multiplying the
hourly rate by the number of hours the
employee would have worked for the week if
the accident had not intervened. In no
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by
less than 2 0 for the purposes determining
the weekly wage.
The Commission's reliance on subsection (e) is misplaced in the
case at bar because it fails to take into account the fact that
Mr. Green had voluntarily limited his participation in the
labor market to only twelve to fourteen hours per week.
Furthermore, his actual average weekly wage is easily and
accurately
-12-

calculated.

And finally, the Commission wholly ignored the

fairness provisions found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-75(1)(g)(iii) which state:
If none of the methods in Subsection (1)
will fairly determine the average weekly
wage in a particular case, then the
Commission shall use such other method as
will, based on the facts presented, fairly
determine the employee's average weekly
wage. (Emphasis added.)
From the above-cited section, it is clear that the methods
for calculating a worker's wages as identified in subsections
(a) through (e) of § 35-1-75 are not absolute.

This fact is

especially true where the actual average weekly wage of the
applicant is easily computed and is not disputed by any of the
parties.
Petitioners allege that § 35-1-75(1)(e), was intended
to apply in those cases where a new employee suffers an injury
during the first day or two on the job, before ever having had
an opportunity to establish a work pattern consisting of a set
number of hours per week.

It should definitely not apply to

situations such as the instant case, however, where an
individual has voluntarily limited his participation in the
labor market to less than twenty hours per week.

To conclude

otherwise unfairly rewards workers like Mr. Green since they
receive compensation at a higher percentage of their actual
working wage than those who have been working twenty hours or
more per week.

Thus, the fairness provisions of Utah Code

Ann. § 35-1-75 should not be overlooked in the instant case
and Mr. Green should be awarded benefits calculated at the rate
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of 66-2/3% of his actual average weekly wage of $206.00, or
$134.00 per week.
CONCLUSION
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Green's injury of
September 6, 1985, do not rise to the level of a compensable
industrial accident under current Utah law.

Mr. Green had

experienced similar episodes of pain in his back on numerous
occasions prior to this injury.

Furthermore, he testified that

the onset of such pain was associated with the chores he was
performing.

In view of these facts, Mr. Green's injury in

September 1985 cannot be said to have been an unexpected or
unintended occurrence.

In addition, Mr. Green's injury

occurred as he attempted to lift a bucket of debris weighing
only thirty pounds.

The lifting of thirty pounds, even while

leaning over the side of a pickup, does not meet the higher
standard of legal causation required by Allen of workers
suffering from preexisting conditions.
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Green did suffer a
compensable industrial accident, however, the Industrial
Commission erroneously awarded benefits to Mr. Green at a rate
higher than 66-2/3% of his average weekly wage at the time of
his injury.

Section 35-1-75(1)(e) was not intended to increase

the benefits otherwise payable to an applicant in situations
where the applicant has voluntarily limited his piarticipation
in the labor market and his actual average weekly wages are
easily and accurately determined.
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Thus, the findings of the

Commission should be reversed and Mr. Green should be awarded
compensation at the proper rate of $134.00 per week.
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